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Mind is central to law and law shares the problem of mind’s anomalies with 
psychiatry. But psychiatry and law approach psychopathology with very different 
systems of knowledge.  
 
Psychiatry, as a branch of medicine, comes at psychopathology with categories of 
symptoms, diagnoses, biological dysfunction and treatment. But it also makes use of 
psychological and sociological concepts.  Psychology assumes a continuity of 
psychopathology with normal mental functioning and sociology assumes social 
determinants of psychopathology. This plural, or “biopsychosocial”, body moves 
along. Its organs are professional organisations, service delivery, training 
programmes, research activity, and exercises in self-critique (1, 2). It creates the 
shared professional language of clinical psychopathology. 
 
Law is concerned with justice and aims to respect the self-determination of adults 
whom it considers are in sound mind.1 A core concept for human rights based law is 
personal autonomy and law operationalizes this with the components of valid 
consent (3). In recent decades, these categories have increasingly regulated, or 
have attempted to regulate, areas of health and social care where the language of 
clinical psychopathology is indigenous (4). 
 
1 See for example Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s classic statement of this principle in 
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914). “Every 
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be 





In the UK, and in several other jurisdictions, the psychiatric and legal approaches to 
psychopathology are increasingly mixing (5) and this trend will probably continue (6). 
Given the different origins and professional perspectives of clinical psychopathology 
and law this mixing is liable to create confusion but it also affords opportunities. 
Several commentators have criticised the current state of clinical psychopathology as 
narrowly based on symptoms (7-11) and criticisms of mainstream theories of 
personal autonomy are also being expressed (12-14). These critiques emphasise the 
relational, social and value-laden aspects of autonomy and complain that 
mainstream accounts are narrowly individualistic or formal. 
 
When overlapping areas have become narrowed, or siloed, interdisciplinary research 
becomes important. Progress in both clinical psychopathology and legal 
understandings of personal autonomy may come from research strategies that 




What about phenomenology? In psychiatry the word phenomenology strongly 
connotes Karl Jaspers’ approach to psychopathology with his majestic textbook 
‘General Psychopathology’ as the primary source (15). Ghaemi (16) has persuasively 
argued that the core, and lasting, feature of Jaspers’ approach was methodological 
pluralism - the introduction of the distinction between the methods of understanding 
(Verstehen) and explanation (Erklären) to psychiatry’s self-consciousness. But 
phenomenology also has a specific meaning in philosophy (17). I understand 
phenomenology in this philosophical sense as a qualitative discipline that interprets 
structures of subjectivity or the meanings and values structuring intentional mental 
life. It is both descriptive and analytical and engages with ethical and ontological 
matters. This philosophical sense of phenomenology has significant links with 
psychiatry (18) but much of it lies outside of Jaspers’ approach. 
 
On psychopathology and law Jaspers was remarkably silent. Before the 1930s he 
seems (by his own admission) to have taken the Imperial certainties of German 
mental health law rather too much for granted (15) (pp793-95;839-40) and, from the 
1940s on, he seems to imply that little could be said about the relation of personal 
autonomy to  psychopathology at all (15) (pp755-6). That is perhaps understandable 
given his historical and cultural context. But the 21st century context is different and, 
as we shall see, we need to find balanced ways of thinking about psychopathology 
from an ethical and legal point of view. 
 
Plan for this chapter 
 
Both Jaspers’ methodological pluralism and an approach to psychopathology 
drawing upon phenomenology as a philosophical, qualitative discipline are used to 
inform the interdisciplinary approach taken in this chapter.  It will start with a short 
introduction to the legal components of valid consent and then focus on decision-
making capacity (DMC) and the clinical categories of frontal brain injury, 
schizophrenia and depression. It will look at DMC using clinical epidemiological 
methods (in Jaspers’ mode of explanation) and then clinical phenomenological 
methods (Jaspers’ mode of understanding – though supplemented by 
phenomenology in the philosophical sense). 
 
Valid consent 
Imagine you are deciding about a treatment, selecting a home or purchasing a car. 
Now ask yourself, what makes these decisions valid?  
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This question concerns law because the decisions involve different parties in society 
(you, your doctor, your family, your bank, etc.) and law needs to work out whom to 
justifiably hold accountable should disputes arise. Law’s approach is to posit 3 
elements of valid consent (or valid decision): relevant information, DMC and 
voluntariness (3).   
 
Relevant information 
This element recognises that a person cannot be held accountable for a decision 
unless they are in possession of, or could be in possession of, relevant and 
reasonable amounts of information about the nature and consequences of the 
decision. I might decide to take medication A but if I don’t know that medication A is 
for psychosis or that it may have side effects then law will question valid consent.  
 
Decision-making capacity (DMC) 
DMC is the presumption that the psychological abilities upon which decision-making 
depends are present.  The sort of decision-making abilities that are relevant here are 
ones that relate to self-determination, or, in other words, abilities to make decisions 
for oneself. Legislators and courts have the final word on what these abilities are. 
Grisso and Appelbaum have distilled much US case law on DMC into a four abilities 
model (19).  
 
1. Ability to understand relevant information 
2. Ability to appreciate that information 
3. Abilitiy to reason with that information 
4. Ability to express a choice 
 
In English law “appreciation” and “reasoning” are replaced by “use” and “weigh” (20). 
Whatever the exact words used, the law is trying to capture abilities to absorb 
relevant information, deliberate with that information and effect choice.  
 
The abilities must relate to specific decisions when a decision has to be made (or 
was made), e.g. a treatment decision, a residence decision, a financial decision. 
This is the so-called functional test of DMC. It is not a diagnostic test or a test of 
“reasonable” decision. One can have DMC in the presence of symptoms of mental 
illness and one can have it if making a choice that many would regard as unwise or 
unreasonable. To lack DMC it must be shown that inability to decide is inability due 
to psychopathology2. If any of these abilities are absent then DMC is lacking and 
valid consent (or refusal) cannot be given.  
 
Recent legal debate is addressing a grey area in between valid consent and lacking 
DMC called ‘supported decision-making’. The idea is that if an individual with mental 
disability is at risk of lack of DMC  then the provision of support may remove that risk 
and enable valid consent to be achieved. (13). Debate focuses on what this support 
should look like and its scope and limits. 
 
Voluntariness 
Voluntariness is the requirement that choices are not valid if they are coerced. In the 
extreme case a gun to the head with the threat to pull the trigger unless X is decided 
 
2 There is some debate about whether this “due to” requirement is superfluous but, if 
it is superfluous, it will be superfluous because the absence of the psychological 
abilities is a mental inability itself (i.e. an mental anomaly). So, either way, 
psychopathology and lacking DMC have a deep connection. 
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rather than Y is not a valid consent to X even if all relevant information is disclosed to 
the person deciding and all decision-making abilities (above) are present. In practice 
coercion comes in shades and the law gives recognition of a continuum of threat to 
voluntariness with the concept of ‘undue influence’. 
 
With this brief legal outline of valid consent in place we can see that the component 
where psychopathology most clearly becomes relevant is DMC. But we can also see 
that clinical psychopathology and DMC are not the same thing. To look at 
psychopathology through the perspective of DMC is to look at it differently. 
 
Explaining DMC in terms of clinical psychopathology 
One way to explain (in Jaspers’ sense) DMC in terms of clinical psychopathology is 
through the use of operationalized measures and the statistical methods of 
epidemiology. Random sampling from clinical settings using ICD-10 codes, symptom 
scales and a validated tool for the assessment of DMC (the “MacCAT-T” (19)) allows 
measurements of both clinical psychopathology and DMC and for associations 
between these variables to be tested statistically.   
 
Here I will summarise a selection of studies from the literature that illustrate this 
approach at work and which contribute to knowledge in psychopathology and law.  
 
Psychiatric vs medical 
Much debate has concerned whether there is an essential difference between 
psychiatric disorders and medical disorders (21, 22) but how does this debate relate 
to DMC? When acute psychiatric settings were compared with acute medical settings 
on prevalence of DMC for treatment there were in fact no significant differences (23). 
If one performs a sub analysis of the relevant decision-making abilities, then inability 
to appreciate was more salient than reasoning in the psychiatric setting and vice 
versa in the medical setting (4).   
 
So a remarkable parity exists between psychiatry and the rest of medicine in terms of 
DMC; but the underlying decision–making inabilities in the two settings are different. 
Appreciation is a more evaluative ability than reasoning and because the fact/value 
dichotomy and relativistic attitudes toward values are so influential in contemporary 
culture (24) it is likely that the objectivity of DMC assessment will attract more 
skepticism in psychiatric contexts than medical contexts. But reasoning is also an 
area of considerable debate in psychology and philosophy because of plentiful 
evidence of poor reasoning in the healthy population (25) and so skepticism can be 
directed to the medical setting also (26). This parity of skepticism simply points to the 
need for more in depth study of what appreciation and reasoning, or “use or weigh” 
abilities mean. 
 
Frontal brain injury 
In a sizable number of cases of damage to the human frontal lobe neuropsychology 
has been unable to measure impairment (27) despite patients having marked 
problems with behavior and self-awareness that can be described. The famous case 
of Phineas Gage (28) is a prototype here and in many similar cases DMC is at issue. 
In a study of patients with frontal brain injury using detailed neurocognitive tests and 
a legal standard for the appreciation ability, Dreer and colleagues (29) reported that 
the problems meeting the appreciation standard were unexplained by extant 
neurocognitive measures. This clarifies an interesting conceptual problem: what kind 
of evidence is of use in assessments of DMC in frontal brain injury? In depth clinical 




The symptom profile of schizophrenia is varied and complex and the validity of the 
diagnostic category remains disputed (30). Which symptoms associate most strongly 
with DMC for treatment in people with schizophrenia?  A study of inpatients with 
psychotic symptoms found that there is a rank order in the strength of association. 
Delusions and thought disorder associated most strongly and hallucinations and 
cognitive impairment associated least strongly (31). Also, the category of 
schizophrenia was associated with regaining DMC more slowly compared with other 
diagnoses (32).  
 
So, looked at through the perspective of DMC for treatment, the symptoms of 
schizophrenia that are of greatest interest are delusions and thought disorder rather 
than hallucinations and cognitive impairments. And if one wants to know about time 
frames for regaining DMC, then the diagnosis of schizophrenia is not without 
predictive validity. Many questions remain however about what is underpinning these 
associations between schizophrenia and DMC. 
 
Depression 
Depressive is extremely common and can be severe, recurrent and disabling. The 
psychiatric literature on depression is vast and there is good evidence for effective 
treatments. But how does depression impact upon DMC for treatment? Systematic 
review of empirical evidence reveals a tiny literature in this area and DMC tools have 
measurement problems (33). This may not be a practical problem if psychiatrists 
have other reliable ways of identifying DMC. One possibility is the clinical concept of 
insight. If a patient with severe depression is unable to decide for themselves about 
treatment then, so the thought may go, they will lack insight and be flagged up for 
professional attention that way. But studies of depression and insight show that 
insight lacks sensitivity for severe depression (34) and also lacks sensitivity as a test 
of DMC (31). In other words, patients with severe depression do not have 
characteristically low scores on insight and if they score high on insight this can be 
consistent with lacking DMC.  
 
So we have another conceptual gap and a new question: what are the relevant 
variables for losing the ability to decide for oneself in depression? Again, in depth 
clinical phenomenological studies may help. 
 
 
Understanding mental capacity in terms of clinical phenomenology 
We have seen that explaining DMC in terms of clinical psychopathology yields a kind 
of knowledge. It gives a pragmatic mapping and identifies gaps where more basic 
conceptual work is required. Where gaps are found the methods of understanding 
become indicated to illuminate the meaningful relations between states of mind and 
abilities to self-determine. Here sampling is purposeful rather than random and 
interpretation is in-depth rather than statistical. A method of second-person 
phenomenology has been adapted for this purpose (35). In brief, this method uses 
first person reports but probes and interprets them in the context of an open 
structured interview in which the interviewer (and researchers) aim to make sense of 
the reports and what they imply for self-determination.  I will now report on some 
studies which, using this method, address some of the gaps identified above. 
 
Frontal brain Injury 
The gap between neurocognitive tests of human frontal brain function and inability to 
use and weigh information, discussed above, requires a bridge to be constructed. A 
recent study reviewed relevant neuropsychological research on awareness of deficit, 
metacognition and somatic markers and conducted in-depth interviews with people 
with frontal brain injury (36). A key finding concerned online awareness of disability.  
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Consider this excerpt from an interview with a research participant with injury to the 
frontal lobe: 
 
ABI4: It was really weird because in the hospital, everyone else was really 
bad.  Like they couldn’t walk or talk, totally mute … .  But I was fine, I was 
walking and talking, and I thought everything was fine.  And when I went 
home, I was like gone.  I couldn’t walk, couldn’t walk upstairs.  I was stuck in 
bed, and I couldn’t talk … . But when I was walking and talking I was fine.  
Every single day in the hospital I was asking if I could go home.  “I want to go 
home, I want to go home.  I’m fine, look at me.  You can see I’m fine.”  So 
eventually they gave in and said “Go on then, go home”.  And once I was 
home it was just different, you know.  Before that I’d felt like I was better, I 
was fine … . 
Interviewer: So when you were in hospital you felt it was all ok, you were 
walking around, you could speak, think, express yourself … ? 
ABI4: I was feeling fine, … but once I got out of hospital I realized how bad I 
was. 
Interviewer: Outside of hospital it didn’t work out? 
ABI4: No, that’s when I realized how bad I was.  
 
The excerpt shows that ABI4 does have awareness of his disability (“I realised how 
bad I was.”).  In the interview, and retrospectively, ABI4 shows awareness of his 
disability. But the excerpt also attests to an episode in which ABI4 lacked that 
awareness in a context when a decision had to be made.  
 
A few minutes later in the interview: 
 
ABI4: I want to get out, have a fresh start where no one knows me, and I 
don’t know anybody, and start all over again. Start totally fresh, start a totally 
fresh life, a totally fresh life. 
Interviewer: And when you think like that, do you want to do it by yourself, 
alone, or do you want help from others?  
ABI4: Do it myself. 
Interviewer: Do it yourself? 
ABI4: Yeah.  I mean my uncle, when he got out of the nick … 9 years or 10 
years … .  He’s out now, he’s living up north ... .  When I get out of hospital I 
could go and see him … . 
Interviewer: So what you’re saying is that what you prefer is to start again, 
without any help from others.  That’s very, very different to hospital, isn’t it, 
where there’s an enormous amount of help that you’re getting. 
ABI4: I don’t need this bollocks [hospital care], I’m sick of it. 
 
Recall that ABI4 has just been articulating his awareness of his disability and 
significant support needs.  But as the conversation began to involve deliberation that 
implicates future support needs, he was unable to bring that awareness “online” to 
inform his decision-making.  The consequences of such an inability can be seen in 
an excerpt from a different participant, in which the difference between offline and 
online awareness was exhibited rather dramatically. 
 
Interviewer: I mean, for example, in the restaurant you had somebody kind 
of shout at you after you got irritated and you kind of got into an argument 
which had got a bit out of hand, and it sort of started because, whereas 
before you would have managed the situation, now you lose your temper? 
ABI3: Yeah. 
Interviewer: Can you think of examples like that?  
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ABI3: Yeah it does happen.  It does happen. [Noise from another patient in 
background.] I’ll go out there and punch her on the f***ing nose in a minute if 
she don’t shut up!  
 
Awareness of disability is an important variable for DMC in the population of patients 
with frontal brain injury. However, awareness of disability can take different forms 
(retrospective, concurrent, online) and psychiatry and law need to be able to 
recognize all of them. Practical consequences for assessment of DMC in frontal brain 
injury flow from this result (37, 38).  
 
Schizophrenia 
Jaspers thought that phenomenology was important in identifying schizophrenia as a 
valid category. In other words, he thought that when psychiatry takes an entirely 3rd 
personal approach to schizophrenia (e.g. an entirely biological approach) it was at 
risk of losing its object. But he thought phenomenology was important in a sort of 
negative sense. His view seemed to be that in trying to interpret certain core patient 
experiences we can experience a limit in the scope of Verstehen as a method of 
interpretation (this is what he meant by “un-understandability”). This limit, together 
with characteristic patient self-descriptions such as “passivity” experiences, denoted 
schizophrenic psychic life and demarcated it from affective psychic life (15) (pp 577-
582). So the core phenomenology of schizophrenia for Jaspers seemed to be a 
conjunction of distinctive first-personal experiences (e.g. passivity symptoms) and a 
distinctive second-personal experience (the interviewer experiencing a fundamental 
limit in the interpretability of those experiences). 
 
Assessment of DMC involves interpretation (typically centered on a face-to-face 
interview) so what might this Jasperian point mean in relation to DMC assessment? 
 
To illustrate the challenges of interpretation being referred to here, take this speech 
act from a patient with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. 
 
I went to Samoa. This has been my life in total. I never went there. I was 
taken there again. We got on the plane that took off, we were supposed to 
be flying local, we thought, like in France or something. The plane ended 
up in Tahiti, but the islands were called something in Samoa, so I can’t 
remember whether it was Tahiti or Samoa we were in. I think we were in 
Samoa, but my family, someone was saying it was Tahiti. We landed on an 
Island. In those times they never had airstrips. The plane that brought us 
down was a cargo plane because they never had passenger planes. My 
brother got hold of me and there was a great white shark in the water, off a 
fair bit – it looked like somebody was carrying a door on their back – it was 
that big the shark, its fin. (39) 
 
 
Clearly, understanding what is being meant in this communication is going to strain 
our common sense or folk psychological resources. 
 
In the context of assessment of DMC, Banner and Szmukler (40) have proposed 
interpretative approaches drawing upon the ‘radical interpretation’ of philosopher 
Donald Davidson. The suggestion is that in DMC assessment we should aim to 
clarify the meaning of a decision-making process using the principle of charity. 
Davidson developed the principle of charity as way to interpret any alien speaker 
from scratch (think of an anthropologist’s task of interpreting the language of a tribe 
where no assumptions can be made about shared beliefs or words). According to 
Banner and Szmukler when, after good faith attempts, radical interpretation does not 
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yield translation of meaning about a decision-making process – or a person’s will - 
then one may be unable to attribute DMC. They draw a parallel with Jaspers’ concept 
of un-understandability. 
 
Another interpretative approach is to try to understand the phenomenological 
structure of the decision-making abilities and inabilities at play in schizophrenia. On 
this approach lacking DMC in schizophrenia is not inherently to do with un-
understandability but to do with threats to self-determination. When overt delusion 
and thought disorder is stripped back with close textual interpretation of dialogue 
what kind of underpinning cognitive and emotional rigidity can be identified? How 




Psychopathologists have often remarked on the understandable nature of 
depression. It is, for example, easy to empathise with feeling bad or hopeless in the 
wake of the negative life events that often accompany a depressive episode.  But in 
relation to DMC for treatment this can be a catch. Appelbaum and Roth have put it 
well in the context of challenges in general medicine (41): 
 
“Of all the psychopathological processes associated with refusal [of medical 
treatment], depression is the most difficult to recognize, because it 
masquerades as, ‘Just the way I would think if it happened to me’ … The 
depressed patient is frequently able to offer ‘rational’ explanations for the 
choices that are made.” 
 
We have seen above that there is work to do to specify decision-making abilities in 
depression. A key finding from a recent study aiming to do this (35) concerns 
temporal abilities.  
 
This excerpt illustrates what requires interpretation: 
 
Interviewer:  What’s in your mind? 
D4:   Well nothing 
Interviewer:  And in your feelings? 
D4:   No, I ain’t got no feelings… 
Interviewer: Do you feel sad? 
D4:   No I don’t feel sad, I got no feelings at all, I don’t think. 
I’m anxious again. You know… everything’s a distraction… to 
take me away from what’s going to happen. You know I go 
back to my room and lie there ready, that’s why I lie in my 
room. 
Interviewer:  Ready for what? 
D4:   Ready for death. 
 
In this case of someone with severe depression in good physical health, the future 
was being experienced in a characteristic way. The ability to experience the future as 
open was compromised (death was the dominating awareness) and there was 
inability to experience a present task of deliberation and choice about treatment as 
shaping the future. There was inability to project oneself into significant normative 
differences and also inability to imagine different future treatment scenarios in some 
degree of detail when needed. Taken together this cluster of temporal inabilities can 
call into question self determination in relation to treatment. How can there be using 




In the cases of mild-moderate depression studied, these temporal abilities were 
preserved (35) and here the concept of supporting decision-making to enable valid 
consent (see above) is likely to be more relevant than DMC assessment. 
 
With an understanding of the relevant abilities and inabilities, we are in a better 




Psychiatry and the Law share psychopathology as a problem. Once we step back 
and reflect that psychopathology concerns the human being then the shared nature 
of the problem is not surprising. Clinicians are concerned with promoting human 
health and quality of life; law is concerned with ensuring that the human being’s 
fundamental rights are respected. One point of specific overlap concerns DMC. 
 
This chapter has summarized an interdisciplinary research approach to DMC. Some 
classic concepts from the clinical psychopathological stable – brain injury, 
schizophrenia, delusion, insight, and depression – have been looked at through the 
perspective of DMC and using the methodological pluralism of Jaspers. Through the 
perspective (or lens) of “Erklären” measurement of DMC patterns in selected clinical 
populations has been presented and this has also clarified some questions that are 
unsolved such as ‘how does frontal brain injury or depression impact on abilities to 
self-determine?” These questions have then been addressed from the perspective of 
‘Verstehen’ and this has generated new hypotheses about decision-making abilities 
(i.e. opportunities for the perspective of Erklären to grow) but also new illuminations 
of self-determination to aid those who must assess DMC in individuals. Ultimately, 
the assessment and navigation of DMC relates to a single human being and, as 
Jaspers taught us, a human being will elude the single perspective of either Erklären 
or Verstehen.  
 
Much work is still to be done in this area of psychopathology and law and the field of 
research is comparatively new. But there are grounds to think the interdisciplinary 
approach outlined here contributes to a balanced and objective understanding of the 
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